International Commitments
International Commitments captures a nation's expressed interest in international (technical) cooperation and trade, as well as international security concerns about a nation. Use 'International Commitments' to understand the level of a nation's connectedness to the global diplomatic and economic infrastructure and to assess existing export controls and proliferation risk.
(Multilateral) Nonproliferation Agreements
Non-Proliferation Agreements refer to the structured policies, guidelines, agreements, and mechanisms established or supported by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to promote the safe, secure, and peaceful use of nuclear energy and technology worldwide. These frameworks serve as international standards and cooperation models in the fields of nuclear science, safety, security, and non-proliferation.
Components
Nonproliferation Treaty
The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The Treaty represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States. Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970. On 11 May 1995, the Treaty was extended indefinitely. A total of 191 States have joined the Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon States.
INFCIRC/66-Type Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2)
An INFCIRC/66-type agreement refers to item-specific safeguards agreements between the IAEA and a state that is not party to the NPT. The agreement only applies only to specifically listed nuclear material, equipment, and facilities. The state commits to not use the specific safeguarded items for military purposes.
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement
A CSA is a nuclear safeguards agreement that all non-nuclear-weapon states party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) conclude with the IAEA. Under a CSA, the IAEA has the right and obligation to ensure that safeguards are applied to all nuclear material in the territory, jurisdiction or control of the State for the exclusive purpose of verifiying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Voluntary Offer Agreement
A Voluntary Offer Agreement (VOA) is a safeguards agreement between the IAEA and one of the five nuclear weapons state (NWS) party to the NPT. The IAEA applies safeguards to nuclear material in facilities that the state has voluntarily offered and the IAEA has selected for the application of safeguards. Under a VOA, the IAEA verifies that nuclear material remains in peaceful activities and is not withdrawn from safeguards except as provided for in the agreement.
Additional Protocol
The Additional Protocol (AP) is a protocol to a safeguards agreement that provides the IAEA with additional tools for verification. Under the AP, the IAEA is granted expanded rights of access to information and locations in the States. By enabling the IAEA to obtain a much fuller picture of such States’ nuclear programs, plans, nuclear material holdings and trade, the AP increases the IAEA’s ability to provide much greater assurance on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in those States. Furthermore, the United States has an AP in force and there are legally-binding reporting requirements for nuclear fuel cycle-related activities conducted in the United States.
Small Quantities Protocol
The SQP is an amendment to a CSA intended for states with minimal or no nuclear material. The SQP simplifies a state's safeguards obligations by exempting them from most of the reporting and inspection requirements of a full CSA. It is designed to reduce the safeguards burden on states with very small or no nuclear programs, while maintaining the integrity of the international safeguards system. In 2005, the IAEA approved a revision of the standard text of the SQP. This revision changed the eligibility criteria for an SQP and reduced the number of measures from the CSA that are held in abeyance for SQP signatories. Of particular importance a State with a modified SQP must notify the IAEA if it decides to construct or authorize construction of a nuclear facility. At this point, the SQP becomes non-operational. In addition, under the modified SQP, a State is required to provide the IAEA with an initial inventory report, and the Agency is permitted to carry out ad hoc and special inspections. Without a Modified SQP in place for a state, the IAEA is limited in what conclusions it can draw about the state's safeguards compliance.
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its 2005 Amendment are the main international legal instruments in the area of nuclear security adopted under the IAEA’s auspices. The CPPNM establishes legal obligations for Parties regarding the physical protection of nuclear material used for peaceful purposes during international transport, the criminalization of certain offences involving nuclear material, and international cooperation, for example, in the case of theft, robbery or any other unlawful taking of nuclear material or credible threat thereof.